NEWS
RELEASE – Dec. 6, 2006
UN
ICTR- ADAD
Arusha, TZ
[Association de Avocat de la Defence]
ARUSHA, TZ, Dec. 6, 2006 – Following conclusion of testimony from
UNAMIR second-in-command, Belgian Col. Luc Marchal, the Bureau of ADAD
re-iterates its call for the investigation and prosecution of members
of the RPF/RPA and Rwandan President Kagame by the ICTR Prosecutor as
required by the mandate of the UN Security Council Resolutions 955 (1994);
1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004).
The Bureau of the ADAD notes with
alarm the November 23, 2006 Press Conference of ICTR Deputy-Registrar,
Everard O’Donnell, and an ICTR Press Statement of November 30,
2006 [both of which are available as e-mail attachments], which further
call in to question the impartiality of the Tribunal These public statements
from the ICTR, itself, both appear calculated to discredit ADAD, and
the defence more generally, for the offense of calling attention to
facts that are in the public record…and which are an open secret
to all those who have followed the history of the ICTR.
The fact remains that the ICTR was
mandated by the UN Security Council to prosecute crimes international
level that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, and that this mandate has NOT
been carried out during the 12 years ICTR’s existence. The fact
also remains that it is ONLY recently discovered evidence which confirms
that RPF/RPA crimes had been known to the UN since at least October
1994, and that sufficient evidence to prosecute Kagame for the assassination
of former President Habyarimana has been known to the Prosecutor since
at least 1997.
Col. Marchal has added his testimony
to the eye-witness evidence already in the ICTR record, and confirmed
by French Judge Bruguiere, that Kagame’s assassination of Habyarimana
was the first phase of a war of aggression that began on the night of
April 6, 1994. Col. Marchal also testified that, from a military standpoint,
the rapid RPF/RPA advance between April and July 1994 could only have
been accomplished as the result of a well-organized and executed military
plan.
By attempting to distract attention
away from this growing body of evidence, the public attacks on ADAD
by organs of the Tribunal, and representatives of the Rwandan government,
merely confirm that ADAD’s concerns regarding the lack of impartiality
at the ICTR are well-founded.
The November 23, 2006 Press Conference
(which Hirondelle News Service noted was held with the Rwandan Representative
to the ICTR); the public attack on ADAD by the Rwandan Representative
to the Tribunal himself on the same day; and, the November 30, 2006
ICTR Press Statement (which attempts to put a benign face on a completely
improper position by the Tribunal, itself)….ALL call into question
the fundamental impartiality and integrity of the ICTR process. [copies
available as e-mail attachment].
The obviously one-sided character
of the operation of the ICTR is detailed in the Statement issued by
ICTR Detainees in response to the November 23 Press Conference of the
Deputy Registrar.
Unlike either the Prosecution or
Defence, the Tribunal is obligated to adhere to principles of impartiality
and fairness which are seriously compromised when Tribunal administrators
and spokespersons publicly comment upon the substance of cases currently
pending before the Tribunal. This impression of partiality or bias is
of particular concern when only one side in a war-time situation has
been held to account, which is the unfortunate history of the ICTR to
this date.
The demand of ADAD to investigate
and prosecute all crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 is nothing more
than insistence that the ICTR adhere to the mandate of the Security
Council which established the Tribunal. There is nothing in the Rules
of the Tribunal that would prevent the President, or the Chambers, from
requiring that the Office of the Prosecutor fulfill the mandate of the
Tribunal.
First: The Report of Judge Bruguiere
is merely an example of the new evidence from a wide range of sources,
including the testimony of Col. Marchal, as well as previously classified
UN and US documents that are part of the record in Military 1, but have
not been available in any previous trials.
Second: IN July 2005, former U.S.
Ambassador to Rwanda 1990-1993, Robert Flaten, as well as Col Marchal
and others have testified that there was no plan for a “Genocide”
of which he or US, European or UN intelligence sources were aware. Marchal
also testified that the FAR response to Habyarimana’s assassination
was “not planned” and had none of the indications of a “coup”.
Third: Massacres Hutu civilians
on a huge scale by the Tutsi military had occurred in Burundi in late
1993 and 1988…and former U.S. Ambassador Flaten testified that
he personally warned Kagame in early December 1993 that he would be
responsible for predictable massacres of civilians, like those which
had just occurred in Burundi after the assassination of Pres. Ndayi
in October 1993.
Fourth: In addition to the findings
of Judge Bruguiere, the sworn testimony of Col Marchal and sworn testimony
of former RPF officers, who were members of the 1994 assassination team,
as well as, former former attorneys and investigators of the Office
of the Prosecutor Michael Hourigan and Amoudou Deme [who independently
investigated the assassination of Habyarimana and recommended prosecution
to Prosecutor Louise Arbour in 1997] establish that Kagame’s order
to assassinate Habyarimana was transmitted by April 1, 1994.
Fifth: According to Gen. Dallaire’s
testimony, it was he who blocked the investigation of the crash site
by a team of French investigators, who were already in Africa and could
have been on site in a matter of hours because he decided the investigation
would not be credible (even though French nationals were also victims
of the missile attack).
Sixth: The military superiority
of the RPA/RPF as of February 1993 is not subject to dispute. Contemporaneous
Code Cables of April 24, 1994 from Gen. Dallaire to the U.N. report
that the RPA/RPF was not concerned with civilian casualties, but with
winning the war.
Seventh: Every military expert to
examine the capabilities of each side, has testified that the military
superiority of the RPF/RPA meant that the refusal of the RPA/RPF to
negotiate a ceasefire until the civilian killings stopped was an impossible
condition for the over-stretched FAR troops, which has further been
confirmed by Col Marchal.
Eighth: On May 25, 1994, a formal
legal opinion from the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs reported
that the Interim Government, based on the 1991 Constitution, was a legal
government with which the RPF should negotiate, since the proposed Arusha
Accords structure had been made obsolete the by resumption of hostilities
by the RPF.
Even if it were proper for spokespersons
for the Tribunal to comment on evidence in ongoing trials, which it
is NOT, ADAD invites all representatives of the international press
to examine the new documentary evidence and testimony in the Military
1 Trial, to make an independent evaluation of these issues, as have
Judge Bruguiere and Col. Marchal.
- 30 –
Prof. Peter Erlinder, ADAD President
[Eng.]
peter.erlinder@wmitchell.edu
U.S. phone: 1-651-290-6384
ICTR phone: ext. 5073 [TZ cell: 075-425-1460
Me. Christopher Black, ADAD Press Counseilier [Fr.]
bar@idirect.com
ICTR phone: ext. 5288 [TZ cell: 075-266-6972]